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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
NO. 03-2689
____________
SONY DESPALISSE,
Petitioner
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________
On Appeal from the United States Department of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A41 585 036
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 26, 2004
BEFORE: NYGAARD, AMBRO and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed October 28, 2004)
___
OPINION
____________
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge
Sony Despalisse (hereinafter “Petitioner”) comes before this court seeking review
of a final order of the Board Of Immigration Appeals (hereinafter “BIA”), holding that he

is not eligible to apply for discretionary relief from removal. For the foregoing reasons,
we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

I
Petitioner is a native of Haiti, who left his homeland in 1988 to join his family in
the United States. He was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident
on June 3, 1988.
Petitioner has lived in several American cities, including New York, Boston, and
Los Angeles. While in California, Petitioner had several brushes with the law. He was
convicted of prostitution in September, 1992, and was sentenced to twenty-four months
supervised probation. He also plead nolo contendere to prostitution charges in April,
1996 (for which he was sentenced to forty-five days in jail and twenty-four months
probation) and July, 1998 (for which he was sentenced to ninety days in jail and twentyfour months probation). He also pled guilty to possession of cocaine in March, 2000,
which resulted in a sentence of one hundred-eighty days in jail 1 and three years probation.
Upon returning to the United States from a visit to Haiti on April 19, 2001,
Petitioner was detained by the Immigration Service. He was questioned about his
criminal convictions, but later released. On January 10, 2002, Petitioner was served with
a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§
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Petitioner received credit for fifty-one days in actual custody and twenty-five days for
good behavior.
2

1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) and 1182(a)(2)(D)(i). Petitioner moved to cancel.
An Immigration Judge issued an interlocutory ruling on October 25, 2002, holding
that Petitioner was eligible for cancellation of the removal, because he had accrued the
requisite seven years of continuous residence required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2). The
Immigration Judge then exercised his discretionary powers and granted Petitioner’s
application for cancellation of removal and terminated the removal proceedings. The
government appealed to the BIA, which later vacated the Immigration Judge’s
interlocutory ruling. The BIA found that Petitioner’s seven years of continuous residence
were interrupted by his 1992 prostitution conviction, and ordered his removal.
Petitioner submitted a Petition for Review before this Court on May 28, 2003.

II
It is the duty of every federal court to determine whether it has subject matter
jurisdiction to hear a particular case. See Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321
F.3d 411, 420 (3d Cir.2003). Generally, we have jurisdiction to review final orders of
removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). However, in cases such as this one where a final
order of removal has been issued against a criminal alien, our jurisdiction over a Petition
for Review of such an order has been limited by the Congress. See 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(C) (“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal
against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense
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covered in section...1182(a)(2)...”). Thus, we are divested of jurisdiction only when a
petitioner is an alien who may be deported for having admitted or been convicted of one
of the enumerated offenses. See Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d. 246, 247 (3d. Cir. 2001). In
such cases, we have jurisdiction to “determine whether these jurisdictional facts are
present.” See Id. If a petitioner proves that either of the jurisdictional prerequisites is
absent, judicial review is not precluded by section 1252(a)(2), and an order of removal
will be vacated. If he cannot, we are prevented from inquiring further and the order will
be left intact.
Here, it is undisputed that Petitioner is a native and citizen of Haiti, that he has
plead guilty to a controlled substance charge in 2000, and has either been convicted or
pled nolo contendere to three prostitution charges in 1992, 1996, and 1998. A violation
of any law or regulation relating to a controlled substance is a deportable offense under
section 1252(a)(2)(C). See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). Similarly, a crime involving
“moral turpitude” qualifies as a deportable offense. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 2
Because Petitioner is an alien who has admitted or been convicted of four criminal
offenses enumerated in section 1182(a)(2), he is removable and we are without
jurisdiction to further review the BIA’s final order of removal.
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In California, prostitution is considered conduct involving “moral turpitude.” See
People v. Chandler, 56 Cal.App. 4 th 703, 708 (Cal. App.1. Dist., 1997).
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III
As we are without jurisdiction to inquire further, we state no opinion as to the
merit of any of Petitioner’s arguments.3 We do note, however, that “any challenge by a
criminal alien to the BIA’s interpretation of the immigration laws or to the
constitutionality of these laws must be made through a habeas [corpus] petition.” See
Catney v. INS, 178 F.3d 190, 195 (3d. Cir. 1999)(emphasis added). Because this alternate
forum is available to Petitioner to raise such claims, we are satisfied that our decision
today does not work a fundamental injustice or denial of due process on Petitioner.
The Petition for Review is therefore dismissed.
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Petitioner contends that the order of removal raises substantial due process concerns
(namely that the decisions of the BIA “twice denied his ‘opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner’”), that he has a vested right to apply for
cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed), and he was entitled to rely
on that eligibility when he plead nolo contendere and guilty to his three offenses in 1996,
1998, and 2000. A common thread throughout Petitioner’s argument is that the BIA
impermissibly applied the 1996 modifications made by the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
retroactively to United States Code, Title 8.
5

